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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

JOHN SOTER and TOM SOTER,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

vs.
Civil No. 6180
ZEKE SNYDER and STREVELL-PATERSON FINANCE COMPANY, a
corporation,
Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants' brief fairly states the issues of this case, however, since their action lies in fraud and deceit the full circumstances of the case will be presented with particularity in the
argument section of this brief.
3
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT 1.
THE SPECIAL FINDING OF THE JURY THAT DEFENDANT SNYDER DID NOT STATE IN SUBSTANCE:
A. That he grossed over $50,000.00 in 1951,

~nd

B. That he made a net profit of between $7,000.00 and
$8,000.00 in 1951,
IS FULLY SUPPORTED BY ALL OF THE EVIDENCE AND
TESTIMONY IN THIS CASE.

POINT 2.
THE CONDUCT OF APPELLANTS NEGATIVE ANY
MATERIAL REPRESENTATION.

POINT 3.
THE COURT'S JUDGMENT IN THE AMOUNT OF
$10,600.00 IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT SNYDER IS IN
ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND THE AGREEMENT OF
THE PARTIES.

ARGUMENT
POINT 1.
THE SPECIAL FINDING OF THE JURY THAT DEFENDANT SNYDER DID NOT STATE IN SUBSTANCE:
4
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A. That he grossed over $50,000.00 in 1951, and
B. That he made a net profit of between $7,000.00 and
$8,000 in 1951,
IS FULLY SUPPORTED BY ALL OF THE EVIDENCE AND
TESTIMONY IN THIS CASE.

The burden was upon the appellants (Soters) to prove
fraud charged by clear and convincing evidence.

Taylor v. Moore, 51 P. 2d 222
Campbell v. Zion's Coop, 141 P. 401
The respondents (Snyder and Strevell-Paterson) having
prevailed, the evidence must be reviewed in the light most
favorable to them.

Pace vs. Parrish, 247 P. 2d 273
The burden in an action in deceit based upon fraudulent
representations was upon the plaintiffs to prove all of the essential elements:
1. That a representation was made.
2. Concerning a presently existing material fact.
3. Which was false.
4. Which the representer either.
a. Knew to be false, or
b. Made recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient
knowledge upon which to base such representation;

5
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5. For the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon
it.
6. That the other party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity.
7. Did in fact rely upon it.
8. And was thereby induced to act.
9. To his injury and damage.
Stuck v .Delta Land and Water Co., 227 P. 791
Jones v. Pingree, 273 P. 303

23 Am. Jur. 772
Let us examine the facts presented to the jury in the light
of the law stated:
Background Facts of the Delmar Transaction

The Soters first contacted Snyder in August, 1952, answering a newspaper advertisement (R. 25, 58). They understood
Snyder originally asked $27,500.00. Th~y suggested that Snyder
accept their six-plex income property on a trade (R. 49). Snyder
advised them a few days later he was not interested in a trade
deal.
The Soters dropped their interest in purchasing the Delmar
following this call from Snyder and looked around the city
for other beer taverns (R. 68). Sam's Lounge, 4th South and
West Temple was investigated (R. 68). They actually entered
into an earnest money agreement to purchase the Spa Beer
Tavern, 4th South and Main Street, for about $12,000.00
(R. 69), and forfeited deposit money when they decided the
lease was not attractive.
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One evening in November, 1952, the Soters testified they
met a friend "Blackie," a bartender who worked at the Glenwood Club, across the street from the Delmar, and they advised
Blackie of their continued interest in purchasing a beer tavern
(R-71). Blackie recommended they buy the Delmar.
"Across the street, the Delmar, that's a nice place
and they seem to have a nice business" (R-71).
Soter stated:
"I talked to him (Snyder) before, but he wanted too
much money, around $27,500.00 and I wouldn't pay
that much money for it."
Soter then asked Blackie to contact Snyder and determine
if Snyder would accept less than $27,500.00 (R-71).
About three to four days later, Blackie reported to Soter
that he had contacted Snyder and he would cut the price to
$25,000.00. Soter requested that Blackie continue to bargain
for a lower price, and two to three days later, Blackie reported
again to Soter that Snyder would agree to take $23,000 (R-72,
171).
Until the actual meeting of Snyder and the Soters at the
Canton Cafe to consummate the deal held a few days later,
Blackie had not disclosed to Snyder who his interested "buyers"
were (R-75, 172, 176). The Soters then asked Blackie to arrange to meet Snyder with them a few days later to close
the deal (R-72) ; until the Canton Cafe meeting the Soters
directed no inquiry to Snyder about any phase of the business.
7
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Business Experience of Purchasers

At the date of the transaction between the parties, the
plaintiffs had 17 to 18 years of experience in the beer business
in Utah (R-46). Since 1933 they operated two places in Tooele
County-Handy Corner Tavern and Lakeview Cafe (R-47).
In 1948, the Soters sold out the beer places and purchased
the Capitol Motor Lodge (State Street, Salt Lake City) for
$110,000.00 (R-47). This property they sold in January, 1949.
Prior to purchasing the Delmar Lounge from the defendant
Snyder, the Soters owned a six-plex income apartment unit
(R-49) which they originally requested Snyder to accept on a
trade for the Delmar (R-49). In May 1953, nearly six months
after the Delmar purchase, the plaintiffs negot~ated for the
repurchase of the Capitol Motor Lodge, finally buying it back
in October, 1953 (R-58) a 29-unit motel with restaurant. It
is significant in retrospect that plaintiffs' repurchase of the
Capitol Motor Lodge took place about 30 days after attempting
to rescind the Delmar sale, nearly 11 months after the alleged
fraud.
The Agreement

The title-retaining sales agreement (Plaintiff's ''Exhibit
No. 1") provides the Soters pay $23,000.00 for the business
and fixtures, payable $10,000.00 cash, $300.00 per month until
fully paid, without interest. Concurrently, defendant Snyder
executed an attractive lease to the plaintiffs for six years with
an option for an additional five years at $500.00 per month
rent (Plaintiffs' "Exhibit No. 2"). The lease provided, in the
event hard liquor sales were permitted by law, the. rent would
be an additional $50.00 per month. When the plaintiffs atg.
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tempted to rescind the sales agreement September 3, 1953, they
had paid an equity of $12,600.00 on the contract (R-14). Plaintiffs continued to make the monthly rental payments of $300.00
only after being served with a Landlord's Demand to Pay
Rent (R-232, "Exhibit 16-17").
The Transaction

Tom Soter and his father came into the Delmar Lounge
around the first of August, 1952, in reponse to Snyder's advertisement (R-167). Snyder told them he wanted $27,500.00 on
terms, or $25,000.00 cash for his place. Tom Soter suggested
a trade on his six-plex. Snyder was not interested (R-168).
Snyder showed them through the Lounge and said: "It would
be a good buy for a partnership" (R-168). At the early meeting in August, Snyder gave them the rent figure, the cost
of bartender help, light and heat bills. Snyder testified: ''When
I purchased the place I went to the beer distributors and asked
them as to the amount that was sold to the place before I would
buy it and I suggested they do the same" (R-169). The Soters
then made no inquiry with respect to the amount of business
R-169). Snyder told them he was making a nice living and if
he couldn't get his price he wasn't interested in selling"
(R-169.)
Nothing more took place between the Soters and Snyder
until a Friday night in November 1952, just before the election
(R-171) when Blackie contacted Snyder on behalf of some
interested parties (R-172). They haggled over the selling price
and four days later Blackie arranged a meeting between Snyder
and his interested parties at the Canton Cafe (R-173).
9
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Mr. Snyder testified, under direct examination, his version
of the entire Canton meeting set forth as follows: (R-17~·, 174,
175, 176 and 177).

"Q. Did you have any conversations with this person
Blackie between this first meeting and the Canton
meeting?
A. He came back to me and told me we would meet
at eight o'clock, that was all, that he would have
the party there.
Q. Did you know at that time who these parties were
that he was ...
A. No, I had no idea who the party was.
Q. Now, just describe what took place at the meeting
at the Canton Cafe, what you saw and what you
heard, who was there and the whole substance of
your conversation.
A. I walked over from the Delmar to the Canton Cafe
and waited on the outside, and these people - I
waited until above five minutes after eight, and
these people appeared, and it happened to be Tom
Soter, who I had met before, and his brother, John,
who I hadn't seen before, and they introduced me to
John Soter. Blackie, of course, was there, and we
went up into the balcony part of the cafe, and we
ordered some coffee, and we started in talking, and
they said they were interested in buying it, but the
twenty-seven thousand .five hundred dollars didn't
seem a right figure for them to pay.
I says, 'Well, I don't know. Blackie had told me
you wanted to pay cash for it, and I had told Blackie
I had lowered the price to twenty-five thousand,
which you had probably been told about.'
So they asked me about the amount of business
that I had done. I told them that I .. I says, 'There
10
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is only one way for you to get a true picture of
buying a business. That is to see how much has
been purchased. You have the privilege of going
to the beer distributors and getting these figures;
and in the meantime, if I shouldn't call, which I
will call on if I get to it, you call me or have them
call me if you are there in their business, and I
will give them the authority to show you the books.'
I says, 'And from the amount that you find out
from the distributors and the costs that I have given
you, the costs of the employees, the entertainment,
and the rent and everything, including license and
insurance, and the amount that we get for the
product that we sell, you should determine from
those figures whether I am making no money or
not, because you have been in the beer business.'
(Italics added.)
So we finally got down to a figure. They still said
it was too high, so we came down to twenty-three
thousand dollars. I told them that I wanted to go
into the used-car business. They says, 'Well, the
twenty-three thousand dollars sounds all right to us.'
I says, 'Well, twenty-three thousand cash.'
They says, 'No, we will give you ten thousand
down and the balance on terms of three hundred
dollars a month.'
I says, 'Well, if that is all the cash I am going to
get, and to go into the used-car business, I would
naturally need a little more money, and I would
have to pay interest, so I think it isn't unfair if I
should ask you for five per cent interest, and I know
that I will have to pay six, eight, or possibly ten.'
It turned out I pay one per cent a month, which
happens to be twelve. They says, 'Well, why don't
you give us a good deal' . . .
11
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Q. Who said this?
A. Tom and John both. 'Why don't you give us a good
deal and not charge us any interest?'
I says, 'Well,' I says, 'At least at the very minimum for three per cent interest.'
'No, we will take the place, and we want something we can make a living in.'
I says, 'Well, you can make a living provided
you both work a shift, but if you have no intention
of working a shift, don't buy the Delmar.'
They says, ·well, we are going to work a shift.
That is why w~ are buying it.'
Finally we come to an agreement that we would
meet in Mr. Bernstein's office, who happened to be
my attorney at the time, and draw up the papers,
and in Mr. Bernstein's office I told them and I told
them at the meeting provided they weren't given a
license, and although the papers were signed and
no license was available to them, but wouldn't be
given to them, that they did not have to go through
with their contract; and later on we went into the
attorney's office and had the contract drawn up.
Now when we went to Sam Bernstein's office,
who happens to be in the same room with Mr. Metos,
who is the plaintiff's attorney here, Mr. Bernstein
drew up the lease and also the conditional sales
contract. Mr. Metos read both. Tom Soter read them.
I believe his father looked at them also. His brother,
John Soter wasn't there at the time. Before Tom
Soter signed the contract, the lease and the conditional sales contract; Mr. Metus said to him, 'Now,
this is what you want? You are sure you know
what you are signing?' and Mr. Tom Soter said,
'Why, yes. This isn't the first business I have ever
bought.'

12
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Q. What date was that statement made?
A. That was made on November 14, I believe, at the
signing of the lease, the date of the sale.

Q. Is that the date the lease bears ?
A. I believe so. I believe the conditional sales. I'm not
sure as to the lease. They took place over on December 1.

Q. 14th day of November, both instruments bear that
date. Now, referring again to the Canton Cafe before we get off that subject, did either John or Tom
Soter ask you specifically how much business you
had done in the year 1952 up until the time this
conversation took place?
A. They asked me how much business I was doing. I
couldn't give them any figure in '52 because there
wasn't any figure to give them. I told them over the
period of years that I had operated the Delmar
I presume it would average approximately fifty
thousand a year. I had no books.
Q. Did you bring any books with you that night?
A. No, no books whatsoever.

Q. Did they ask you to go get any books that night?
A. No. I told them as far as books were concerned, I
says, 'Anyone can give you a set of books.' I says,
·you want the true figure. If you want the true picture, the only fay you can get the true picture is
from the distributors.'

Q. Were you asked by Blackie the night that you made
this arrangement to bring your books with you at
that meeting?
A. No, sir. I didn't know who the party was even."
Defendant Snyder's direct examination testimony regarding the representations follows: (R-179)
13
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"Q. Did you ever make the statement, Mr. Snyder, to
either Tom or John Soter, or his father, at any time,
that you did fifty to sixty thousand dollars' worth
of business a year and specifically in the year 1951.
A. No.
Q. Were you ever asked a statement how much business
did you do in the year 1951?
A. No.
Q. Did you ever make the statement, Mr. Snyder, either
to John or Tom Soter at any time that you made a
profit of between seven to eight thousand dollars
a year?
A. I never said that I made a profit of seven or eight
thousand dollars a year. I told them that I made a
good living out of the Delmar, and I also stated
that I figured it was a good living because I had
paid twenty-eight hundred dollars a year payments
on my home, and with the life insurance that I
carry on my wife and myself I presume it would
cost me in the neighborhood of five thousand
dollars. It could have cost me less to live. There
was no exact figure as to the amount that I had
earned.

Q. Did you ever make a statement with respect to how
much money you were drawing out of the business?
A. Yes. The same amount."
Viewed by present-day business dealings between buyer
and seller, the protest that this transaction was fraudulent had
a hollow ring which seven of eight jurors recognized.
The record is fully quoted to illustrate how completely fair
Snyder dealt with the Soters. The Soters knew the beer business

14
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first-hand. They tried unsuccessfully to pawn off upon Snyder
an exchange property of their own. Snyder told them unless
he got his price he wasn't interested in selling and that the
Delmar would be a good business provided the Soters worked
behind the bar themselves (R-105). Snyder was not interested
in selling at his first meeting and the Soters looked for other
taverns. They investigated two others and actually made a
deal forfeiting their deposit money because of a poor lease.
Then they again sought out Snyder through Blackie as undisclosed parties, toward the end of obtaining a substantial
price reduction. The Soters admitted relying upon Blackie's
estimate of the business not Snyder's. The price reduction was
their main objective and when the business failed to meet
their expectation they cry fraud for the first time eleven months
later. During the first three months of their operation knowing
the business to be under expectation, the Soters induced StrevellPaterson Company to make a substantial loan to Snyder and
admit in writing they have no other claim or set-off against
the transaction. In March and April of 195 3 they list the property for sale themselves and for $3,000.00 more than they paid
(R-63). The whole key to this contest lies primarily in the
Soters' desire to take back the Capitol Motor Lodge which
they first attempted in May of 1953, six months after the Delmar
deal, and finally succeed in doing in October 1953 (R-57-58).
Again, on August 30, 195 3, the Soters treat the Delmar as
their own and list it for sale with Thayne Adams Company
at $25,000.00, $2,000.00 more than they paid Snyder (R-64).
This jury wasn't blind to the fact that the Soters desired
to get out of the Delmar deal in order to get back into the
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Capitol Motor Lodge deal. In order to give his full time to the
Capitol management, one of the Soters quit barten~ing in
October, 1953. Fraud was a clear afterthought that backfired.
Mr. Snyder at no time represented the business earned
a net profit of between $7,000.00 and $8,000.00 in 1951, or
that he grossed in excess of $50,000.00 that year. What he
said was that he drew that out of the) business to live on and
over the years (since 1949) the business had averaged about
$50,000.00 considering the total volume divided by the total
number of years he had the business.
Snyder invited the Soters to check with his beer suppliers
and on that basis to determine if he was making an attractive
profit. Soters' recollection that he had made this statement several time was not clear (R-222). Finally, in July 1953, the Soters
contacted these beer distributors (R-103) and did obtain this
information, but over six months later.

rryo Their Injury and Damage"
The Soters produced their profit and loss statement at the
trial showing their twelve months' operation from the date of
purchase to November 30, 1953 (Ex. P-3). Once again their
claim of fraud is exploded by neither damage nor injury, but
relatively good business considering the fact that for the year
1953-1954, all businesses were somewhat depressed.
Their statement shows the following:

16
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Beer Sales ----------------------------------$3 3,069.9 3
Soft Drink Mixers-------------------- 5,217.91
Miscellaneous---------------------------617.95
Amusement Machines ______________ 1,964.00
Punch Boards---------------------------- 1,485.10
Total Gross Receipts ----------------$42,354.89
Cost of Merchandise Sold ________ 17,010.14
Gross Profit on Total Recepits
Less Operating Expenses:
Salaries paid others -----------------Repairs and upkeep -----------------Taxes and lic~nses -------------------Advertising -----------------------------Miscellaneous ---------------------------Utilities ______________________ -------------Sign rental maintenance-----------Rent -----------------------------------------Bad checks -------------------------------Linen ---------------------------------------Ice ---------------------------------------------Insurance ---------------------------------Depreciation ------------------------------ ·

$25,344.75
4, 44 7.10
621.61
1, 748.05
101.4 5
400.28
1,28 3. 32
407.21
6, 000.00
429.0 3
266.08
200.01
582.12
2,310.00

Total operating expenses__________

$18,796.26

Net Profit before owners' salaries

$ 6,548.49

The Soters' net profit after taking a depreciation loss of
$2,}10.00, the cost of the business over ten years, is in excess
of $6,500.00 and including depreciation equals $8,858.49. It is
a little hard to understand what injury and damage actually
resulted to the Soters from their own figures. Their own figures
betray their claim of any damage.

17
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In the light of the background of all the facts necessary
to make out the fraud case, it is not· difficult to understand the
jury's finding. Applying the formula for fraud, the Soters
would bat exactly zero on each of the nine elements constituting
fraud by the previous decisions of this Court.

POINT 2.
THE CONDUCT OF APPELLANTS NEGATIVE ANY
MATERIAL REPRESENTATION.
Approximately three months after the sale of the Delmar
Lounge respondent Zeke Snyder negotiated a loan with StrevellPaterson Finance Company offering the contract between himself and the Soters as collateral security for the repayment
of such loan. Before making the loan Strevells required a statement from appellants as to the amount owning by them to Mr.
Snyder, as well as an acknowledgment that there were no offsets or claims against said amount.
This statement of balance owing was introduced in evidence as Exhibit D-4 and was identified by John Soter, who on
cross examination testified that the statement was signed in
the latter part of February after appellants had sustained a
loss for the months of December and January and were behind
for the month of February (R. 107-108). Mr. Soter further
testified that he was informed by respondent that the latter
was attempting to make a loan; "that Strevells wanted to make
sure appellants don't have any claims or off-sets against that
amount (R.108) and:
18
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"Q. As a matter of fact, when Mr. Snyder gave you
that statement to sign, you didn't make any protest
about it, did you?
A. No.

Q. You didn't tell him you were reluctant to sign it,
did you?
A. No, sir.

Q. You didn't tell Strevell-Paterson you were reluctant
to sign?
A. No, sir.

Q. You signed it, didn't you?
A. Exactly.
Q. And you read it over before you signed it?
A. That's right.
Q. And you knew Mr. Snyder couldn't get his loan unless you signed it?
A. I guess that's right.

Q. You had business with Strevell before?
A. We have, yes.

Q. And when you did business and made a loan, they
required security?
A. Exactly.
Q. And you knew they were requiring verification of
this contract and the fact that there was no dispute
between you before they would loan Mr. Snyder
that money?
A. That's right.
Q. And you signed it so he could get the loan?
A. Exactly.
19
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Q. And you didn't call Strevell's and tell them anything about it?
A. No, sir."
If there had been any representation ,made to appellants
by respondent Snyder as to the volume of business done or his
"take-home pay" upon which from the business appellants
relied on entering into the contract for the purchase of the
Delmar Lounge as claimed in the pleadings, then surely appellants would have refused to sign any statement admitting
there were no off-sets or charges but would have questioned
the contract at that time and would have protected themselves
with respect to the matter.

POINT 3.
THE COURT'S JUDGMENT IN THE AMOUNT OF
$10,600.00 IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT SNYDER IS IN
ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND THE AGREEMENT
OF THE PARTIES.
The Soters entered into an absolute and unconditional
promise to pay Snyder $23,000.00 for the business and fixtures.
They breached their agreement on September 3, 195 3, after
paying in $10,000.00 cash, eight monthly payments of $300.00
each, making a total of $12,400.000, owing Snyder the balance
of $10,600.00 and flatly refusing the pay him any more.
Utah does not have a Uniform Conditional Sales Act,
and in almost all jurisdictions, whether the Act is in effect
or not, a conditional vendee's promise to pay the purchase
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price gives the vendor the absolute right to the purchase price
where that promise to pay is unconditional.
47 Am. fur. Sales, Section 894

p. 102

Appellants' single case authority, American-La France Fire
Engine Co. v. Bagge (1929) District Court of Appeal, Third
District, California, 276 P. 1066, is not authority for his proposition since a collateral agreement rendered the promise to pay
conditional.
Granted that defendant Snyder had the right of repossesion upon buyers' default, he was likewise entitled to have
his just demands against the defaulting purchasers satisfied.
Snyder had several methods of securing this right. He could
have retaken the property or he could have recovered the
purchase price. The fact that he had the right to retake possession does not restrict or bar his right to recover the purchase
price. 47 Am. fur. Sales, Section 895, P. 103.
Appellants have confused Snyder's substantive rights with
his procedural rights. Snyder is entitled to only one satisfaction
against the buyers and that is what he sought here, a judgment
for the balance due under the contract. See 101 ALR 520, and
18 Am. fur., Section 36, P. 156.
To limit Snyder only to retake possession after default
would be totally unjust, for the Soters also were tenants of
Snyder of his real property. By keeping up the monthly lease
payments and defaulting on the fixture agreement, the Soters
would, by their reasoning compel Snyder to retake the fixtures
while requiring him to rent them his premises.
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The contract language is clear. Upon failure of the Soters
to make the payments, Snyder declared the entire purchase price
due and upon the Soters' failure to pay the accelerated sum,
the contract provides Snyder "may" retake possession of the
property. This right to elect a remedy should not prevent the
conditional seller from standing on the contract and suing for
the full purchase price. Appellants contend the legal effect of
this paragraph is to give Snyder only one remedy upon the
Soters' default. The law is otherwise and it should be so, even
without statutory provision. The Court awarded judgment to
Snyder in the sum of $10,600.00 together with interest, and
required that upon the paym<:)nt in full of said judgment,
Snyder shall deliver to the Soters full title to all of the personal property, an Order that is entirely consistent with the
Seller's remedies and the Buyer's rights.

CONCLUSION
This case was fully tried and considered by a jury and
Court. We respectfully submit that the judgment appealed
from should be affirmed.
Dated this 4th day of August, 1954.
A. W. SANDACK
Attorney for Defendant Zeke Snyder
ARTHUR H. NIELSEN
Attorney for Defendant StrevellPaterson Finance Company, a corporation
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